In 1982 Dolev, Klawe & Rodeh presented an O(n log n) unidirectional distributed algorithm for the circular extrema-nding (or leader-election) problem. At the same time Peterson came up with a nearly identical solution. In this paper, we bring the correctness of this algorithm to a completely formal level. This relatively small protocol, which can be described on half a page, requires a rather involved proof for guaranteeing that it behaves well in all possible circumstances. To our knowledge, this is one of the more advanced case-studies in formal veri cation based on process algebra.
Introduction
Experience teaches that distributed protocols are hard to de ne correctly. This is not only due to the inherent complexity of distributed systems, but it is also caused by the lack of adequate techniques to prove the correctness of such protocols. This means that there are no good ways of validating designs for distributed systems. The current approach to proving correctness of distributed systems generally uses stylished forms of hand waving that does not always avoid the intricacies and pitfalls that often appear in distributed systems. We are convinced that more precise proof techniques need to be used, which should allow for computer based proof checking. Concretely this means that a logic based approach should be taken.
The language CRL (micro Common Representation Language) 13] has been de ned as a combination of process algebra and (equational) data types to describe and verify distributed systems. In accordance with the philosophy outlined in the rst paragraph this is a very precisely de ned language provided with a logical proof system 14]. It is primarily intended to verify statements of the form Condition ! Speci cation = Implementation: This system has been applied to verify a number of data transfer and distributed scheduling protocols of considerable complexity 3, 11, 12, 15] . It incorporates several old and new techniques 4, 3] . Due to the logical nature of the proof system proofs can be veri ed by computer. Some sizable examples of proofs veri ed using the proof checker Coq 9] are reported in 14, 16] .
If one develops a new technique then it is important that it is validated that the technique meets its purpose. For CRL this means that it is applied to a wide range of distributed systems. In this paper we show its applicability on Dolev, Klawe and Rodeh's leader election or extrema nding protocol 10] that has been designed for a network with a unidirectional ring topology. At the same time, Peterson published a nearly identical version of this protocol, see 19] . This protocol is e cient, O(n logn), and highly parallel. As far as we know this is the rst leader election protocol veri ed in a process algebraic style. In 7] a number of leader election protocols for carrier sense networks have been speci ed and some (informal) proof sketches are given in modal logic.
In Section 2 we specify Dolev, Klawe and Rodeh's leader election protocol formally in CRL. The protocol is proven correct in Section 3 using a detailed argument. Appendix A summarises the proof theory for CRL, and Appendix B de nes the data types used in the speci cation and proof of the protocol.
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Speci cation and Correctness of the Leader Election protocol
We assume n processes in a ring topology, connected by unbounded queues. A process can only send messages in a clockwise manner. Initially, each process has a unique identi er ident (in the following assumed to be a natural number). The task of an algorithm for solving the leader election problem is then to make sure that eventually exactly one process will announce itself to be the leader. In Dolev, Klawe and Rodeh's algorithm 10] each process in the ring carries out the following task: The intuition behind the protocol is as follows. In each round the number of electable processes decreases, if there are more than two active processes around. During each round every active process, i.e., a process in state Active, receives two di erent values. If the rst value is larger than the second value and its own value, then it stays active. In this case its anti-clockwise neighbour will become a relay process. So, from every set of active neighbours, one will die in every round. Furthermore, the maximal value among the identi ers will never be lost in the ring network, it will traverse the ring in messages, or be stored in a variable in a process, until only one active process remains. If only one active process is left, i.e., not in state Relay, then the leader-in-spe sends its own value of d to itself, and then declares itself a leader.
As the attentive reader may have noticed, there is a simpler way to elect a leader. For example, it would be su cient for a process to receive just one value, i.e., the value (e) of its direct neighbour. In this case, only two values instead of three values have to be compared (e > d instead of e > max(d; f)). However, this approach is not so e cient as one may need 2n 2 +2n actions before a leader is selected. The protocol described earlier is faster. It is bounded by 2n logn + 2n actions because in every round at least one process becomes inactive.
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For an explanation of these complexity bounds one is referred to 10].
Below we formalise the processes and their con guration in the ring as described above in CRL. act r; s : Nat Nat proc Active(i; d; n:Nat) = s(i; d) P e:Nat r(i ? n 1; e) (leader / eq(d; e) . s(i; e) P f:Nat (r(i ? n 1; f) Active(i; e; n) / e > max (d; f) . Relay(i; n)))
Here a process in the imperative description with value ident for d corresponds to Active(i; ident; n). Intuitively the CRL process rst sends the value of the variable d to the next process in the ring (s(i; d)) via a queue, which is described below. Then it reads a new value e from the queue connected to the preceding process in the ring by an action r(i ? n 1; e). The notation ? n stands for subtraction modulo n, which is de ned in Appendix B. Consequently, it executes a then-if-else test denoted by / . . If the variables d and e are equal, expressed by eq(d; e), then the process declares itself leader by executing the action leader. Otherwise the value of e is sent (s(i; e)) and a value f is read (r(i ? n 1; f)). Now, if e is larger than both d and f the process repeats itself with e replacing d.
Otherwise, the process becomes a relay process (denoted by Relay(i; n)).
In order to prove the correctness of the protocol we must be precise about the behaviour of the queues that connect the processes. We assume that the queues have in nite size and deliver data in a strict rst in rst out fashion without duplication or loss. In the queue data is stored in a data queue q which is speci ed in Appendix B. Note that the behaviour of the queue is straightforward; it reads data via r(i; d) at process i and delivers it via s(i + n 1) at process i + n 1 (+ n is addition modulo n).
proc Q(i; n:Nat; q:Queue) = P d:Nat r(i; d) Q(i; n; in(d; q))+ s(i + n 1; toe(q)) Q(i; n; untoe(q)) / not empty(q) .
It remains to connect all processes together. First we state that send actions s communicate with receive actions r. Then, using the processes Spec 0 and Spec we combine the processes with the queues, and assign a unique number to them. The process Spec(n) represents a ring network of n processes interconnected by queues. 1 By logn, we mean log 2 n. Spec(n:Nat) = fcg @ fr;sg (Spec 0 (n; n))
Since the protocol is supposed to select exactly one leader after some internal negotiation we formulate correctness by the following formula, where`=' is to be interpreted as`behaves the same': Theorem 2.1. For all n : Nat n > 0 ! Spec(n) = leader
The theorem says that in a ring with at least one process exactly one leader will be elected after some internal activity. However, as experience shows the correctness reasoning above is too imprecise to serve as a proof of correctness of the protocol. Many, often rather detailed arguments, are omitted. Actually, the protocol does not have to adhere to the rather synchronous execution suggested by the word`rounds', but is highly parallel. One can even argue that given the large number of rather`wild' executions of the protocol, the above description makes little sense. Therefore, we provide in the next sections a completely formalised proof, where we are only interested in establishing correctness of the protocol and not in proving its e ciency.
A proof of the protocol
The proof strategy for proving the correctness theorem consists of a number of distinct steps. First in Section 3.1 we de ne a linear representation of the speci cation in which the usage of the parallel composition operator in the original speci cation is replaced by a tabular data structure encoding the states of processes in the network, and actions with guards that check the contents of the data structure. The linearised speci cation is proven equivalent to the original speci cation in Lemma 3.3. Then, in Section 3.3, we de ne a (focus) condition on the tabular data structure such that if the condition holds then no internal computation is any longer possible in the protocol, i.e., no -steps can be made 3]. The focus condition is used in Lemma 3.10, in Section 3.6, to separate the proof that the linear speci cation can be proven equivalent to a simple process into two parts. Lemma 3.10 together with Lemma 3.3 then immediately proves the correctness theorem of the protocol, i.e., Theorem 2.1. The proof of Lemma 3.10 makes use of the Concrete Invariant Corollary (see Appendix A and 4]), i.e., a number of invariance properties are de ned (in Section 3.4) on the tabular data structure such that regardless which execution step the linear speci cation performs, the properties remain true after the step if they were true before the execution of the step. These invariants are used to prove the equality between the linear speci cation and the simple process in Lemma 3.10. In order to make use of the Concrete Invariant Corollary we have to show that the linear speci cation can only perform nitely many consecutive -steps. This is proven in Section 3.5.
Linearisation
As a rst the step leader election protocol is described as a CRL process in a state based style, as this is far more convenient for proving purposes. Active(i; d; n) = Act(i; d; e; n; 0)
Relay(i; n) = Act(i; d; e; n; 4)
Proof. The proof of this lemma is straightforward, using the Recursive Speci cation Principle (RSP), but note that it uses a (p / c . q) = a p / c . a q as well as the distributivity of over +. 2
We now put the processes and queues in parallel. As we work towards the Unity style, we must encode the states of the individual processes in a data structure. For this we take a table (or indexed queue) with an entry for each process i. This entry contains values for the variables d, e, s and the contents of the queue in which process i is putting its data. Furthermore, it contains a variable of type Bool, which plays a role in the proof. The data structure has the name Table and is de ned in Appendix B.
We put the processes and queues together in three stages. First we put all processes together, using Act and X Act below. Then we put all queues together, via Q and X Q . Finally, we combine X Act and X Q obtaining the process X which is a description in Unity style of the leader election protocol.
proc Spec(T:Table; n:Nat) = fcg @ fr;sg ( Act (T; n) k Q (T; n)) Act (T:Table; n:Nat) = / empty(T).
(Act(hd i (T); get d (hd i (T); T); get e (hd i (T); T); n; get s (hd i (T); T)) k Act (tl(T); n)) Q (T:Table; n:Nat) = / empty(T) . (Q(hd i (T); n; get q (hd i (T); T)) k Q (tl(T); n)) X Act (T:Table; n:Nat) = P j:Nat s(j; get d (j; T)) X Act (upd s (1; j; T); n) / eq(get s (j; T); 0) and test(j; T) . + P j;e:Nat r(j ? n 1; e) X Act (upd e (e; j; upd s (2; j; T)); n) / eq(get s (j; T); 1) and test(j; T) . + P j:Nat leader X Act (upd s (6; j; T); n) /eq(get d (j; T); get e (j; T)) and eq(get s (j; T); 2) and test(j; T) . + P j:Nat s(j; get e (j; T)) X Act (upd s (3; j; T)) /not eq(get d (j; T); get e (j; T)) and eq(get s (j; T); 2) and test(j; T) . + P f;j:Nat r(j ? n 1; f) X Act (upd d (get e (j; T); j; upd s (0; j; T)); n)
/get e (j; T) > max(get d (j; T); f) and eq(get s (j; T); 3) and test(j; T) . + P f;j:Nat r(j ? n 1; f) X Act (upd s (4; j; T); n)
/get e (j; T) max(get d (j; T); f) and eq(get s (j; T); 3) and test(j; T) . + P d;j:Nat r(j ? n 1; d) X Act (upd d (d; j; upd s (5; j; T)); n) / eq(get s (j; T); 4) and test(j; T) . + P j:Nat s(j; get d (j; T)) X Act (upd s (4; j; T); n) / eq(get s (j; T); 5) and test(j; T) . X Q (T:Table; n:Nat) = P d;j:Nat r(j; d) X Q (in q (d; j; T); n) / test(j; T) . + P j:Nat s(j + n 1; toe(j; T)) X Q (untoe(j; T); n) / not empty(j; T) and test(j; T) . )
The leader election protocol in Unity form is given below and will be the core process of the proof. Note that in many cases veri cation of a protocol only starts after the process below has been written down. In the description of X most details of the description are directly re ected in corresponding behaviour of the constituents X Act and X Q . However, there is one di erence. It appears that in the protocol two kinds of messages travel around. One that one could call active and others that one could call passive. The active messages contain numbers that may replace the current value of the d-variable of its receiver. The passive messages are not essential for the correctness of the protocol, but only used to improve its speed. For the correctness of the protocol it is important to know that the maximum identi cation number is always somewhere in an active position and no identi cation number is present twice in active positions. In order to distinguish active from passive messages, we have added a boolean b to each position in the queues, where if b = t the position is active, and if b = f the position is passive. When processes become Relays then they also act as a queue. Therefore, we have also added a boolean b to the process parameters, to indicate the status of the message that a process in state 5 is holding. The equation below is referred to by (I) in the remainder of the proof.
proc X(T: Table; n:Nat) = P j:Nat X(upd s (1; j; in q (get d (j; T); t; j; T)); n) / eq(get s (j; T); 0) and j < n . + P j:Nat X(untoe(j ? n 1; upd e (toe(j ? n 1; T); j; upd s (2; j; T))); n) /eq(get s (j; T); 1) and not empty(j ? n 1; T) and j < n . + P j:Nat leader X(upd s (6; j; T)) / eq(get s (j; T); 2) and eq(get d (j; T); get e (j; T)) and j < n . + P j:Nat X(upd s (3; j; in q (get e (j; T); f; j; T)); n) /eq(get s (j; T); 2) and not eq(get d (j; T); get e (j; T)) and j < n . + P j:Nat ( X(untoe(j ? n 1; upd d (get e (j; T); j; upd s (0; j; T))); n) /get e (j; T) > max(get d (j; T); toe(j ? n 1; T)) and eq(get s (j; T); 3) and not empty(j ? n 1; T) and j < n . )+ P j:Nat ( X(untoe(j ? n 1; upd s (4; j; upd b (toe b (j ? n 1; T); T))); n) /get e (j; T) max(get d (j; T); toe(j ? n 1; T)) and eq(get s (j; T); 3) and not empty(j ? n 1; T) and j < n . )+ P j:Nat X(untoe(j ? n 1; upd d (toe(j ? n 1; T); j; upd s (5; j; upd b (toe b (j ? n 1; T); T)))); n) /eq(get s (j; T); 4) and not empty(j ? n 1; T) and j < n . + P j:Nat X(in q (get d (j; T); get b (j; T); j; upd s (4; j; T)); n) / eq(get s (j; T); 5) and j < n .
De nition 3.2. The function init : Nat ! Table, which is used for denoting the initial state of the protocol, is de ned as follows: init(n) = if (eq(n; 0); t 0 ; in(n :
? 1; n : ? 1; 0; 0; f; q 0 ; init(n : ? 1))):
See also Appendix B.5.
3. Spec(T; n) = fcg @ fr;sg ( Act (T; n) k Q (T; n)) = fcg @ fr;sg (X Act (T; n) k X Q (T; n)). Now expand X Act (T; n) k X Q (T; n) and apply hiding. The equations obtained in this way match those of X(T; n), except that`j < n' is replaced by`test(j; T)' or`test(j; T) and test(j ? n 1; T)'. As X is convergent (proven in Lemma 3.7) it follows with the Concrete Invariant Corollary 4] that Spec(T; n) and X(T; n) are equal. The invariant`test(j; T) = j < n' is used and easy to show true. 4. By induction on m, using associativity and commutativity of the merge. 5. Directly from the previous case, i.e. Lemma 3.3.4. 6. Directly using cases 3 and 5. 2
Notation
In the sequel we will for certain property formulas (j) write 8 j<n (j) for 0 (0; n) and 8 i<j<n (j) for 0 (i + 1; n) and 9 j<n (j) for 00 (0; n) and 9 i<j<n (j) for 00 (i + 1; n) and P j<n (j) for 000 (0; n) where 0 (j; n), 00 (j; n) and 000 (j; n) are de ned by: 0 (j; n) = if (j n; t; (j) and 0 (j + 1; n)); 00 (j; n) = if (j n; f; (j) or 00 (j + 1; n)); 000 (j; n) = if (j n; 0; if ( (j); 1; 0) + 000 (j + 1; n)): Note that if we can prove that (j < n and (j)) ! (j); then we can also show that 8 j<n (j) ! 8 j<n (j) and 9 j<n (j) ! 9 j<n (j):
Also note that not (8 j<n (j)) = 9 j<n not (j) and not (9 j<n (j)) = 8 j<n not (j)
Focus Condition
The focus condition FC : Table Nat ! Bool indicates at which points the leader election protocol cannot do -steps. This means it can either do nothing, or do a leader action.
FC(T; n) = 8 j<n not eq(get s (j; T); 0) and (not eq(get s (j; T); 1) or empty(j ? n 1; T)) and
(not eq(get s (j; T); 2) or eq(get d (j; T); get e (j; T))) and
(not eq(get s (j; T); 3) or empty(j ? n 1; T)) and (not eq(get s (j; T); 4) or empty(j ? n 1; T)) and not eq(get s (j; T); 5)
Some invariants of X
In this section we state four invariants (Inv 1 ; : : :; Inv 4 ) of the process X(T; n) that are used in Section 3.6 to prove the correctness of the protocol. We prove that the predicates below are indeed invariance properties in a traditional manner. First we show that they hold in the initial state of the protocol, i.e., for invariant Inv i we show Inv i (init(n); n). Then for each protocol step (there are eight such steps in the linearised process X) we show that if both the precondition of the step holds and the predicate holds in the state before the protocol step, then the predicate holds also in the state that is the result of performing the step. For example, to prove that Inv 2 is an invariance property we need to establish that the rst step in X preserves the property, i.e., that eq(get s (j; T); 0) and j < n and Inv 2 (T; n) ! Inv 2 (upd s (1; j; in q (get d (j; T); t; j; T)); n)
where T is a tabular data structure. This entails proving a large number of rather trivial lemmas, such as: qsizes(upd s (1; j; T); n) = qsizes(T; n) We omit here the rather long and tedious details of these proofs. In order to establish that Inv 3 and Inv 4 are indeed invariants we rst have to prove additional statements on the behaviour of the protocol, i.e., Inv 5 ; Inv 6 ; Inv 7 , Inv 8 and Inv 9 in Sections 3.4.5 to 3.4.9 respectively.
Acceptable states
Each process is in one of the states 0; : : :; 6: Inv 1 (T; n) = 8 j<n 0 get s (j; T) 6
Bound on the number of messages in queues
Invariant Inv 2 expresses the property that the number of processes in state 1 or 3 is equal to the number of processes in state 5 plus the number of messages in message channels.
Inv 2 (T; n) = eq(nproc(T; 1; n) + nproc(T; 3; n); nproc(T; 5; n) + qsizes(T; n)) where nproc(T; s; n) = P j<n if (eq(get s (j; T); s); 1; 0) qsizes(T; n) = P j<n size(get q (j; T))
Termination of one process implies termination of all processes
Invariant Inv 3 expresses that if a process is in state 6, then all processes are either in state 4 or state 6. It is provable using invariant Inv 9 .
Inv 3 (T; n) = (9 j<n eq(get s (j; T); 6)) ! 8 j<n eq(get s (j; T); 4) or eq(get s (j; T); 6)
Max is preserved
In the initial state, init(n), the maximal identi er in the ring is equal to n? Inv 4 (T; n) = 9 j<n ActiveNode(n ? 1; j; T) or ActiveChan(n ? 1; get q (j; T)) where 3.4 Some invariants of X ActiveNode(k; j; T) = (eq(get s (j; T); 0) and eq(get d (j; T); k)) or ((eq(get s (j; T); 2) or eq(get s (j; T); 3) or eq(get s (j; T); 6)) and eq(get e (j; T); k)) or (eq(get s (j; T); 5) and get b (j; T) and eq(get d (j; T); k)) ActiveChan(k; q) = if (empty(q); f; (hd b (q) and eq(k; hd(q))) or ActiveChan(k; tl(q))) An identi er has not been lost if it can in the future be received by another process and replace the value of the d variable of that process. Identi ers can be stored either in a variable, in a process (ActiveNode) or in a channel (ActiveChan).
Trivial facts
Inv 5 formulates two trivial protocol properties, that all identi ers are less than n (less than or equal to the maximal identi er n ? 1), and that the values of variables d and e di ers when a process is in state 3. where Cons(j; T; n) = Cons q (get q (j; T); j; T; n) and if (eq(get s (j; T); 5) and not get b (j; T); Ne(get d (j; T); get q (j; T); j; T; n); if (eq(get s (j; T); 1) or eq(get s (j; T); 2); E(get d (j; T); get q (j; T); j; T; n); t)) Cons q (q; j; T; n) = if (empty(q); t; Cons q (tl(q); j; T; n) and if (hd b (q); t; Ne(hd(q); tl(q); j; T; n))) Neq(k; j; T; n) = ((eq(get s (j; T); 2) or eq(get s (j; T); 3)) and not eq(get e (j; T); k)) or (eq(get s (j; T); 4) and Ne(k; get q (j; T; n); j; T; n)) or (eq(get s (j; T); 5) and get b (j; T) and not eq(get d (j; T); k)) Ne(k; q; j; T; n) = if (empty(q); Neq(k; j + n 1; T; n); hd b (q) and not eq(hd(q); k)) Eq(k; j; T; n) = ((eq(get s (j; T); 2) or eq(get s (j; T); 3)) and eq(get e (j; T); k)) or (eq(get s (j; T); 4) and E(k; get q (j; T; n); j; T; n)) or (eq(get s (j; T); 5) and get b (j; T) and eq(get d (j; T); k)) E(k; q; j; T; n) = if (empty(q); Eq(k; j + n 1; T; n); hd b (q) and eq(hd(q); k))
Active and passive messages
The invariant Inv 7 characterises the relation between neighbour processes and channel contents. where Alt(j; T; n) = if (eq(get s (j; T); 0) or eq(get s (j; T); 3) or (eq(get s (j; T); 4) and not get b (j; T)) or (eq(get s (j; T); 5) and get b (j; T)); secondary(get q (j; T); j; T; n); primary(get q (j; T); j; T; n)) primary(q; j; T; n) = if (empty(q); eq(get s (j + n 1; T); 2) or eq(get s (j + n 1; T); 3) or eq(get s (j + n 1; T); 6) or ((eq(get s (j + n 1; T); 4) or eq(get s (j + n 1; T); 5)) and get b (j + n 1; T)); hd b (q) and secondary(tl(q); j; T; n)) secondary(q; j; T; n) = if (empty(q); eq(get s (j + n 1; T); 0) or eq(get s (j + n 1; T); 1) or ((eq(get s (j + n 1; T); 4) or eq(get s (j + n 1; T); 5)) and not get b (j + n 1; T)); not hd b (q) and primary(tl(q); j; T; n))
The intuition for the rather complex looking invariant is to capture the protocol property that there are two kinds of messages sent: active messages which are received by the following process as values on the e variable and which can subsequently replace the d value of the process. The passive messages are received as values on the f variables (state Three) and will not replace the original d value of the process. The Alt property guarantees that an active message can never be received as a passive message (or vice versa), i.e., neighbour processes and channels are always kept synchronised by the protocol. Inv 7 is needed to establish the invariants Inv 8 and Inv 4 , to guarantee that identi ers are neither duplicated nor lost.
In order to prove Inv 7 in particular the following two lemmas are useful. For example, Lemma 71 allows us to conveniently prove that secondary(get q (j; T); j; T) implies secondary(get q (j; T 0 ); j; T), assuming that the channels get q (j; T) and get q (j; T 0 ) are identical.
Lemma 71 (T; T 0 ; n) = 8 j<n eq(get q (j; T); get q (j; T 0 )) ! (secondary(get q (j; T); j; T; n) ! secondary(get q (j; T 0 ); j; T 0 ; n)) $ (even(size(get q (j; T))) ! (secondary(q 0 ; j; T; n) ! secondary(q 0 ; j; T 0 ; n))) and (not(even(size(get q (j; T))))) ! (primary(q 0 ; j; T; n) ! primary(q 0 ; j; T 0 ; n))))
Similarly, Lemma 72 is convenient for proving that the transition from state 3 to state 4 preserves the invariant:
Lemma 72 (T; n) = 8 j<n (Alt(j; T) and not empty(j; T) and secondary(get q (j; T); j; T) and eq(get s (j + n 1; T); 3) ! not toe b (j; T))
Uniqueness of identi ers
Inv 8 expresses the fact that identi ers can occur in at most one \active" position in the ring of processes. It is provable with the help of Inv 7 .
Inv 8 (T; n) = 8 k<n Count(T; k; n) 1 where Count(T; k; n) = P j<n if (ActiveNode(k; j; T); 1; 0) + P j<n ActiveChanOcc(k; get q (j; T)) ActiveChanOcc(k; q) = if (empty(q); 0; if (hd b (q) and eq(k; hd(q)); 1; 0) + ActiveChanOcc(k; tl(q))) Intuitively, the de nition of Count counts the number of times an identi er occurs in an \active" position, i.e., in a position such that the identi er can be transmitted and received by another process and later replace the d value of that process. An identi er in an active position can either occur in a variable (ActiveNode) or in a channel (ActiveChanOcc).
Identi er travel creates relay processes
Inv 9 points out that if two processes contain the same identi er (k) then the processes in between are guaranteed to be in state 4 and the connecting channels all empty. It is provable using Inv 8 .
Inv 9 (T; n) = 8 k<n 8 i<n (eq(get s (i; T); 1) or eq(get s (i; T); 2)) and eq(get d (i; T); k) ! (8 j<n eq(get s (j; T); 0) ! not eq(get d (j; T); k)) and (8 j<n ActiveNode(k; j; T) ! empty(get q (i; T)) and EmptyNodes(i; j; n; T)) and (8 j<n ActiveChan(k; get q (j; T)) ! eq(hd(j; T); k) and hd b (j; T) and if (eq(i; j); t; eq(get s (j; T); 4) and empty(get q (i; T)) and EmptyNodes(i; j; n; T))) where EmptyNode(j; T) = eq(get s (j; T); 4) and empty(j; T) EmptyNodes(i; j; n; T) = if (i < j; 8 i<l<j EmptyNode(l; T); (8 l<j EmptyNode(l; T)) and (8 i<l<n EmptyNode(l; T)))
Convergence of the protocol
In this section we prove that the linear process X is convergent, i.e., that we can nd a decreasing measure on the data parameter over the -steps in the X process operator. This result implies that all sequences of -steps are nite, which is a necessary condition for applying the Concrete Invariant Corollary. We prove that the function Meas de ned below is a decreasing measure, and thus proving convergence.
Meas(T; n) = P j<n if (eq(get s (j; T); 0); (n : ? if (eq(get s (j; T); 1; 3); 1; 0)).
We have a sequence of theorems that are useful to show that Meas(T; n) shows that all -sequences in X are nite. Proof. All statements are proven by induction on (k ? n j).
2
Corollary 3.5.
1. For n > 0 and 0 k < n we nd Term(k; T; st) < 2n provided st < size(get q (k; T)). (n + 2) actions to select a leader. This is a very rough measure; looking at the far sharper bound in 10] suggests that the bound can actually be improved to 4n log 2 n + 2n actions.
Final calculations
We now prove the following crucial lemma that links the leader action to X. But rst we provide an auxiliary function that expresses that no process j < n is in state six.
De nition 3.9.
nonsix(T; n) = 8 j<n not eq(get s (j; T); 6): Lemma 3.10. The invariants Inv 1 (T; n); : : :; Inv 4 (T; n) imply: X(T; n) = (leader / nonsix (T; n) . ) / FC(T; n) . (leader / nonsix (T; n) . ):
Proof. We show assuming the invariants Inv 1 (T; n); : : :; Inv 4 (T; n) that T: Table; n:Nat:(leader / nonsix (T; n) . ) / FC(T; n) . (leader / nonsix (T; n) . ) is a solution for X in (I). As (I) is convergent, the lemma follows from the Concrete Invariant Corollary (see 4]). First suppose FC(T; n) holds. This means that we must show that leader / nonsix (T; n) . = P j:Nat leader (leader / nonsix (upd s (6; j; T)) . ) /eq(get s (j; T); 2) and eq(get d (j; T); get e (j; T)) and j < n . :
(1)
Note that it follows from FC(T; n) that the other summands of (I) may be omitted. As nonsix (upd s (6; j; T)) = f, equation (1) reduces to: leader / nonsix (T; n) . = P j:Nat leader / eq(get s (j; T); 2) and eq(get d (j; T); get e (j; T)) and j < n . :
Now assume nonsix (T; n). From FC(T; n) and Inv 1 (T; n) is follows that 8 j<n 1 get s (j; T) 4:
First we show that 9 j<n eq(get s (j; T); 2) and eq(get d (j; T); get e (j; T)). Now suppose 9 j<n eq(get s (j; T); 1) or eq(get s (j; T); 3):
Hence, using Inv 2 (T; n) and nproc(T; 1; n)+nproc(T; 3; n) > 0 and (3), it follows that qsizes(T; n) > 0.
Hence, 9 j<n size(j ? n 1; T) > 0. Hence, using the focus condition and Inv 1 (T; n): 9 j<n eq(get s (j; T); 2) and eq(get d (j; T); get e (j; T)):
Now suppose not 9 j<n eq(get s (j; T); 1) or eq(get s (j; T); 3):
Hence, using (3) it follows that 8 j<n eq(get s (j; T); 2) or eq(get s (j; T); 4):
Now assume 8 j<n eq(get s (j; T); 4):
But this contradicts Inv 4 (T; n) in conjunction with Inv 2 (T; n). Hence, using (4) it follows that 9 j<n eq(get s (j; T); 2):
From this and FC(T; n) it follows that 9 j<n eq(get s (j; T); 2) and eq(get d (j; T); get e (j; T)):
Hence, using the SUM3 axiom the right-hand side of (2) has a summand leader : (5) But using some straightforward calculations (5) has the right-hand side of (2) as a summand. Hence, if nonsix (T; n) then (2) is equivalent to leader = leader which is clearly a tautology. Now assume not nonsix (T; n). Hence, 9 j n eq(get s (j; T); 6). Using Inv 3 (T; n) it follows that 8 j<n eq(get s (j; T); 4) or eq(get s (j; T); 6):
Hence (2) reduces to = which is clearly true. Now suppose the focus condition does not hold, i.e., not FC(T; n). We nd (where we use that n > 0 and Milner's second -law (T2)):
(leader / nonsix (T; n) . ) = P j:Nat (leader / nonsix(T; n) . ) / j < n . + P j:Nat leader /nonsix(T; n) and eq(get s (j; T); 2) and eq(get d (j; T); get e (j; T)) and j < n .
Now note that it follows from Inv 3 (T; n) that if 9 j<n eq(get s (j; T); 2), then nonsix (T; n). So, (6) reduces to: P j:Nat (leader / nonsix (T; n) and j < n . )+ P j:Nat leader / eq(get s (j; T); 2) and eq(get d (j; T); get e (j; T)) and j < n . = ( P j:Nat (leader / nonsix (T; n) and j < n . ) / not FC(T; n) . )+ P j:Nat leader / eq(get s (j; T); 2) and eq(get d (j; T); get e (j; T)) and j < n . = P j:Nat (leader /nonsix(upd s (1; j; in q (get d (j; T); j; T)); n) . ) / eq(get s (j; T); 0) and j < n . + P j:Nat (leader / nonsix (untoe(j ? n 1; upd e (toe(j ? n 1; T); j; upd s (2; j; T))); n) . ) /eq(get s (j; T); 1) and not empty(j ? n 1; T) and j < n . + P j:Nat leader (leader / nonsix (upd s (6; j; T); n) . ) /eq(get s (j; T); 2) and eq(get d (j; T); get e (j; T)) and j < n . + P j:Nat (leader / nonsix (upd s (3; j; in(get e (j; T); j; T)); n) . ) /eq(get s (j; T); 2) and not eq(get d (j; T); get e (j; T)) and j < n . + P j:Nat ( (leader / nonsix (untoe(j ? n 1; upd d (get e (j; T); j; upd s (0; j; T))); n) . ) /get e (j; T) > max(get d (j; T); toe(j ? n 1; T)).
(leader / nonsix (untoe(j ? n 1; upd s (4; j; T)); n) . )) /eq(get s (j; T); 3) and not empty(j ? n 1; T) and j < n . + P j:Nat (leader / nonsix (untoe(j ? n 1; upd d (toe(j ? n 1; T); j; upd s (5; j; T))); n) . ) /eq(get s (j; T); 4) and not empty(j ? n 1; T) and j < n . + P j:Nat (leader / nonsix (in q (get d (j; T); j; upd s (4; j; T)); n) . ) /eq(get s (j; T); 5) and j < n . Because FC(T; n) = f, nearly all the summands given above are equal to . 2 3.6.1 Proving Theorem 2.1
Finally we are ready to prove that the main theorem of the paper holds, i.e., n > 0 ! Spec(n) = leader Proof. Using Lemma 3.3 we know Spec(n) = X (init(n); n): From Lemma 3.10 it then follows that Spec(n) = (leader / nonsix (init(n); n) . ) / FC(init(n); n) . (leader / nonsix (init(n); n) . ): However, FC(init(n); n) is not true if n > 0 while nonsix(init(n); n) is true. Therefore n > 0 ! Spec(n) = leader is true. 2 
Conclusion
We have outlined a formal proof of the correctness of the leader election or extrema nding protocol of Dolev, Klawe and Rodeh in CRL. The proof is now ready to be proof checked conform 2, 12, 16, 20] . It is shown that process algebra, in particular CRL, is suited to prove correctness of highly non trivial protocols. A drawback of the current veri cation is that it is rather complex and lengthy. A possible lead towards improvement is given by Frits Vaandrager in 21], where by using the notion of con uency (see e.g. 18]) one only needs to consider one trace to establish correctness. Currently we are formalising this notion in 5]. We expect that using this idea our proof can be simpli ed signi cantly.
A An overview of the proof theory for CRL We provide here a very short account of the axioms that have been used. We also give the Concrete Invariant Corollary for referencing purposes.
All the process algebra axioms used to prove the leader election protocol can be found in Table 1{6 . We do not explain the axioms (see 1, 4, 14]) but only include them to give an exact and complete overview of the axioms that we used. Actually, the renaming axioms are super uous, but have been included for completeness.
Besides the axioms we have used the Concrete Invariant Corollary 4] that says that if two processes p and q can be shown a solution of a well founded recursive speci cation using an invariant, then p and q are equal, for all starting states where the invariant holds. It is convenient to use linear process operators, which are functions that transform a parameterised process into another parameterised process. If such an operator is well founded, it has a unique solution, and henceforth de nes a process. Note that if a linear process operator is applied to a process name, it becomes a process in Unity format. ?; ; max : Nat Nat ! Nat eq; ; ; <; >: Nat Nat ! Bool var n; m : Nat rew P(0) = 0 P(Sn) = n even(0) = t even(S(0)) = f even(S(S(n))) = even(n) n + 0 = n n + Sm = S (n + m) n :
? 0 = n n :
? Sm = P(n :
? m) n 0 = 0 n Sm = n + (n m) max(n; m) = if (n m; n; m) eq(0; 0) = t eq(0; Sn) = f eq(Sn; 0) = f eq(Sn; Sm) = eq(n; m) n 0 = t 0 Sn = f Sn Sm = n m n m = m n n > m = n Sm n < m = Sn m
We write 1 for S(0), 2 for S(S(0)), etc, in the standard manner. ? mmod n; n : ? (mmod n : ? k mod n))
B.4 Queues
We use two kind of queues which are subtlely di erent. 
